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SECURITIES
By ROBERT E. OLSEN* AND WENDY H. LYNCH**
This section is concerned primarily with how recent decisions
of the Tenth Circuit have affected pleading and proof in securities
cases. Six cases are discussed. Of these, the most significant is
Holdsworth v. Strong, I one of the progeny of Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder,l which reexamined the elements of due diligence and
reliance in 10b-5 actions. The other cases considered dealt with
land sales as securities transactions, the awarding of attorney's
fees and implied section 15(c) civil actions, the defense of sover-
eign immunity, the determination of a "security" as a factual
question, and derivative actions for the recovery of short-swing
profits. If any trend is evidenced in these cases, it is that the
Tenth Circuit, perhaps unlike the Supreme Court, continues to
give expansive interpretations to the federal securities laws, find-
ing nontechnical, common law solutions to increasingly technical
statutory problems.
I. DUE DILIGENCE AND RELIANCE IN 10b-5 ACTIONS
On March 30, 1976, in the Ernst & Ernst decision, the United
States Supreme Court held that "scienter," which it defined as
the defendant's intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,3 must
be alleged and proved to establish liability under section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and rule 10b- 51 promulgated
* Associate, Calkins, Kramer, Grimshaw & Harring, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1966,
Harvard University; M.A., 1967, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1975, University of
Denver.
* B.B.A., 1972, Pace University; J.D., 1977, University of Denver.
545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976).
2 425 U.S. 185, rehearing denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976).
425 U.S. at 193.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970). Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or ap-
propriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976). Rule 10b-5 provides:
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thereunder. Among the many matters left unresolved by this
holding was the continued validity of the traditional defense of
lack of due diligence. The Tenth Circuit, in Holdsworth v.
Strong,' was the first court to consider that continued validity.
By analogy to the common law of torts, the court held that proof
of the plaintiff's failure to exercise due diligence did not bar re-
covery where intentional conduct on the part of the defendant
was required to be proved.
The trial court in Holdsworth concluded that the defendant
had intentionally defrauded the plaintiffs, within the meaning of
rule 10b-5, when he purchased their minority shares in a close
corporation.! Prior to the sale, plaintiff K. Jay Holdsworth and
the defendant, both founders of the corporation, had been direc-
tors, close personal friends, and business associates for more than
ten years. Both were lawyers, and plaintiff Holdsworth was also
an accountant. Plaintiffs sold their stock without first examining
the books and records of the corporation. The defendant's mis-
representations concerning the financial condition of the corpora-
tion were major elements of the fraud."
The defendant's principal argument on appeal was that, be-
cause of Holdsworth's status as a corporate insider, an attorney,
and an accountant, Holdsworth had a duty to ascertain the finan-
cial condition of the company prior to selling his stock. The defen-
dant also argued that the plaintiffs were not justified in relying
upon the defendant's misrepresentations.'
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
An initial opinion in the case was subsequently withdrawn, apparently as a result
of the intervening Ernst & Ernst decision.






The court considered the primary issue to be:
[W]hether in an intentional fraud case such as the instant one, the
victim is barred from relief if he does not exercise due care to avoid
being deceived, due diligence being generally defined as the require-
ment that an insider "must fulfill a duty of due care in seeking to
ascertain for himself the facts relevant to a transaction" before he
may claim reliance on a material misrepresentation or omission.'0
Because a private right of action under 10b-5 was judicially
implied" and not expressly permitted by statute, courts had to
define the elements of that action.'" Gradually, courts evolved
standards of conduct to which plaintiffs were required to con-
form,'3 and "[a]lthough a variety of rationales has been used, a
common doctrinal end has been reached: the plaintiff will not be
able to successfully maintain a private 10b-5 suit if his own care-
lessness has contributed to his loss."'
4
That the due diligence requirement was a judicial creation
helps to explain a lack of consistency in decisions considering it.
Several courts have described the due diligence requirement in
terms of the plaintiff's reasonable reliance on the defendant's
misrepresentations or omissions.15 Other courts have explained
Id. at 692 (citation omitted).
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
,2 Wheeler, Plaintiff's Duty of Due Care Under Rule 10b-5: An Implied Defense to
an Implied Remedy, 70 Nw. U.L. Rav. 561, 568 (1975); Note, The Due Diligence Require-
ment for Plaintiffs Under Rule 10b-5, 1975 DUKE L.J. 753, 761 [hereinafter cited as The
Due Diligence Requirement].
'" The Due Diligence Requirement, supra note 12, at 754. In Straub v. Vaisman &
Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,623 (3d Cir., June 15,
1976), the court traced the development of the due diligence requirement, observing that
initially a defendant's failure to disclose facts, even if the facts were material, would not
result in a cause of action under rule 10b-5. Where the plaintiff had actual knowledge of
the facts, such knowledge would, in effect, destroy the requisite materiality. Some courts
took a further step and began to deny recovery in those cases where the plaintiff had
constructive knowledge of the information withheld by the defendant. In an effort to
prevent investor carelessness and to reduce the number of 10b-5 suits, plaintiffs' actions
were closely examined, often in terms of materiality and reliance, and each plaintiff was
required to show that he exercised due care or due diligence in the transaction. Id. at
90,109.
4 Wheeler, supra note 12, at 568.
" In Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 409 (3d Cir. 1973), the court noted that
"[tihe cases generally hold that before an insider may claim reliance on a material
misrepresentation or nondisclosure, he must fulfill a duty of due care in seeking to ascer-
tain for himself the facts relevant to a transaction." Accord City Nat'l Bank v. Vander-
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the requirement in terms of the defendant's duty to disclose' or
in terms of the materiality of the information;" while still others
have imposed a duty of due care without any particular explana-
tion or discussion of it."
In Holdsworth, the Tenth Circuit treated the plaintiff's due
diligence as a separate issue, i.e., as an affirmative defense, 9 and
compared it to the common law tort defense of contributory negli-
gence. 0 This comparison required that the court distinguish those
10b-5 cases in which the defendant's misrepresentation or nondis-
closure resulted merely from his negligence. Thus the court
noted: "[Wihile . . . contributory negligence is logically related
to negligence where the defendant is charged with negligent mis-
representation, . . . where he is charged with intent to defraud,
mere contributory negligence of plaintiff becomes trivial in com-
parison."' The court quoted, with approval, Dean Prosser's state-
ment that "where there is an intent to mislead . . . mere negli-
gence of the plaintiff is not a defense ....
As the Holdsworth court recognized, those circuits which
have most clearly required due diligence on the part of the plain-
tiff are generally those which have allowed a 10b-5 action based
upon the defendant's negligent conduct.13 Because Ernst & Ernst
boom, 422 F.2d 221, 230 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970). See Myzel v. Fields,
386 F.2d 718, 735-36 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
11 In other words, where the plaintiff had ready access to the misrepresented or non-
disclosed information, the defendant may have had no duty to disclose. White v. Abrams,
495 F.2d 724, 735-36 (9th Cir. 1974); Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 420 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974). See Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 641-42
(7th Cir. 1963).
See Taylor v. Smith, Barney & Co., 358 F. Supp. 892, 896 n.11 (D. Utah 1973).
" Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 521 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); Wheeler, supra note 12, at 573.
" See The Due Diligence Requirement, supra note 12, at 760, wherein the author
urged that due diligence be treated as a separate element, stating, "its potential utility is
evident. The approach is also theoretically impeccable." Id.
Although tort concepts, particularly those of fraud and deceit, are not determina-
tive of 10b-5 actions, such concepts have often been utilized as an interpretive aid. See
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Straub v. Vaisman & Co.,
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,623, at 90,110 (3d Cir. June
15, 1976); Landy v. Federal Depository Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 169 (3d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1291 (2d Cir. 1973);
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963).
, 545 F.2d at 694.
22 Id. (quoting W. PROSSEa, THE LAw OF TorTS 716 (4th ed. 1971)).
13 545 F.2d at 692; 2 A. BROMBERG, SEcurrms LAw: FRAuD § 8.4, at 652 (1975). See
VOL. 54
SECURITIES
required that scienter now be proved, the continued validity of
those decisions became important. The Tenth Circuit reasoned:
Use of the tort analogy plainly demonstrates the inappropri-
ateness of due diligence in 10b-5 suits under the Ernst & Ernst
doctrine, for the due diligence standard as applied to 10b-5 suits is
about the same as the application of contributory negligence. Just
as contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort case
of fraud, similarly due diligence is totally inapposite in the context
of intentional conduct required to be proved under Rule 10b-5. 4
Although the defense of lack of due diligence was rejected
under the facts of Holdsworth, it is important to consider that in
Holdsworth there was "substantial evidence of intentional fraud
and deceit . "25 It is, therefore, unclear that the Tenth Circuit
has completely foreclosed the use of the defense of due diligence
in 10b-5 actions. The defense may still apply if, for example, the
defendant's misrepresentation or omission was the result of reck-
lessness,"0 or it may remain a valid defense if the defendant and
the plaintiff were both reckless, i.e., if the defendant's conduct
was something less than intentional while the plaintiff's conduct
was something more than merely negligent.
The Holdsworth court seemed to acknowledge these possibil-
ities when it stated: "The importance of Ernst & Ernst in the
present case is that it calls for scrutiny of the defense of due
diligence and prompts the question [of] whether it applies to
these facts even if it is applicable to more extreme
circumstances.'"7 Such extreme circumstances might well in-
Bird v. Ferry, 497 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1974); Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1974);
White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974); Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S..30 (1974); Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); City Nat'l Bank
v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); Rogen v. Ilikon
Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963);
Wheeler, supra note 12, at 581. But see Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d
100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971), which applied a duty of due diligence
to intentional misrepresentations.
24 545 F.2d at 694. But see note 45 and accompanying text infra.
545 F.2d at 691.
Recklessness has been defined as conduct "in conscious disregard of, or indifference
to, the risk" that such conduct will be misleading. Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The
Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule 1~b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw.
U.L. REv. 423, 436 (1968). Generally, "[i]ntentional conduct (following the tort pattern)
comports a stricter scienter than reckless conduct. . . although the boundary line is not
easily discernible." BROMaERO, supra note 23, § 8.4, at 542.
545 F.2d at 693 (emphasis added).
1977
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clude gross conduct by the plaintiff over an extended period of
time.28 Thus, the court observed: "If contributory fault of plaintiff
is to cancel out wanton or intentional fraud, it ought to be gross
conduct somewhat comparable to that of defendant. '2 In
Holdsworth, however, the plaintiffs' alleged lack of due diligence
consisted only of a failure to examine the books and records of the
corporation, which records "failed to accurately reflect the condi-
''30tion of the company....
Ernst & Ernst did not address the issue of whether reckless
behavior on the part of a defendant may be sufficient to impose
civil liability under 10b-5. The Supreme Court stated: "In certain
areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of inten-
tional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act. We
need not address here the question whether, in some circumstan-
ces, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. 3' Since Ernst & Ernst, courts have taken note
of this unresolved issue. Some have assumed, for purposes of
argument, that recklessness suffices in a 10b-5 action.32 One court
has specifically interpreted Ernst & Ernst as holding that rule
10b-5 does not encompass negligence but does encompass those
" For example, in Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971), the evidence revealed that, over a period of several
months, the plaintiff received from the defendant checks which were subsequently dis-
honored for insufficient funds. Although such an event normally required a customer's
trading account to be "frozen" for 90 days, the plaintiff continued to transact business
with the defendant customer and to accept his personal checks. In this action, the plaintiff
sought recovery for the last five dishonored checks. However, the court held the plaintiff
to the "objective standard of a reasonable investor exercising due care in light of all facts"
and concluded that the plaintiff's recovery was barred for failure to exercise due diligence
in spite of the fact that the defendant's misrepresentations were allegedly intentional. 434
F.2d at 103-04.
545 F.2d at 693.
Id. at 691.
425 U.S. 185, 193-94 n.12 (1976).
32 Carroll v. Bear, Steams & Co., 416 F. Supp. 998, 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("Even were
we to assume arguendo, that recklessness is a sufficient predicate for 10b-5 liability, under
no stretch of the imagination would the plaintiff's allegations of failure to properly evalu-
ate and diligently research her portfolio and investment objectives amount to reckless-
ness."); Siclari v. Rio de Oro Mining Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,672, at 90,312 (S.D.N.Y., July 21, 1976) ("Even assuming ... that reckless
disregard for the truth can, under certain circumstances, satisfy the scienter requirement
[of Ernst & Ernst] . . .the allegations in the instant case do not rise to such recklessness.
Absent an allegation that the Mining Record had reason to know or suspect that the article
was untrue, recklessness does not exist.").
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actions intended to deceive or "so reckless as to be indistin-
guishable from deliberate fraud."33
In McLean v. Alexander,34 the Delaware District Court held
that an "accountant's 'knowing misconduct' short of actual in-
tent to defraud," was sufficient for 10b-5 liability.35 The McLean
court stated:
It necessarily follows that scienter for purposes of imposition of civil
liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 encompasses knowing
or intentional misconduct. If the result were otherwise, Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 would be more restrictive in substantive scope
than the substantive law of fraud. Reckless disregard for the truth
is also a cognizable basis for liability in common-law fraud actions.
There is no hint in Hochfelder that the court intended a radical
departure from accepted principles."
If, as the above cases appear to indicate, recklessness on the
part of a defendant may subject him to 10b-5 liability, a determi-
nation of whether Holdsworth precluded the use of the due dili-
gence defense under all circumstances is of critical importance.
3
1
When the Third Circuit considered the status of the due
diligence defense following the Ernst & Ernst decision," the court
noted that there are obvious benefits if parties are required to
Coleco Indus. v. Berman, [Aug. 25, 1976] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-16 (E.D.
Pa., Aug. 9, 1976) (digest of opinion).
1, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,725 (D. Del., Aug. 13,
1976).
1 Confronted with the issue of recklessness, which the Supreme Court left unresolved
in Ernst & Ernst, the court ruled that scienter is present when an accountant either has
actual knowledge of material facts which he fails to disclose or recklessly disregards
material facts when rendering an audit opinion. Id. at 90,551-53.
Id. at 90,550.
See Wheeler, supra note 12, at 583:
If the Court decides that negligent conduct cannot support a damage award
under 10b-5. . .the logic of common law doctrine suggests that the due care
defense is either not available at all in this area of the law, or available only
in those cases where the defendant has acted with recklessness, that is, where
the defendant's conduct falls in the middle ground between a negligent and
an intentional violation of the rule.
In McLean v. Alexander, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,725
(D. Del., Aug. 13, 1976), the court reasoned: "There is, however, a wide spectrum of
prohibited behavior between negligence and specific intent to defraud. In that uncharted
land of knowing and reckless midconduct, defendant should be entitled to contest liability
by asserting a due diligence defense." Id. at 90,548.
Straub v. Vaisman & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,623 (3d Cir., June 15, 1976).
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exercise care in securities transactions. 9 Rather than elect be-
tween two extremes-plaintiffs lack of diligence as either com-
pletely irrelevant or as a complete bar to recovery under all cir-
cumstances-the court chose a flexible approach: To encourage
investor caution, a plaintiff must act reasonably. 0 Factors con-
sidered by the Third Circuit in determining such reasonable con-
duct included the existence of a fiduciary relationship; 41 the
plaintiff's opportunity to detect the fraud; the sophistication of
the plaintiff; the existence of a long-standing business or personal
relationship; and the plaintiff's access to relevant information. 2
Given the language of the Holdsworth decision and the facts on
which it was based, it is conceivable that the Tenth Circuit may
also adopt such a flexible approach.
B. Reliance
Like due diligence, reliance by the plaintiff on the misrepre-
sentation or omission of the defendant has been judicially implied
as an element of 10b-5 actions. 4 Although several circuits have
not distinguished due diligence from reliance,44 the Tenth Circuit,
" Id. at 90,110.
Id.
" The Holdsworth court found either a "fiduciary" or "quasifiduciary" relationship
existing between Holdsworth and Strong. 545 F.2d at 697. It based this finding, however,
not on their relationship as minority and majority shareholders respectively, or on any
other fact commonly denoting such a relationship, but rather on their long business and
personal associations. Id. at 696-97. It is doubtful that the court intended to include every
more-than-casual relationship within the scope of a "fiduciary relationship," with the
consequent heightened burdens of disclosure on the so-called "fiduciary." Rather, it would
appear that the court was simply seeking to buttress its argument that a showing of due
diligence was not required in the case of intentional wrongdoing.
" Straub v. Vaisman & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,623, at 90,110 (3d Cir., June 15, 1976).
11 Commentators have agreed that this development results from the tendency of the
judiciary to analogize statutory torts to the common law torts of fraud and deceit. See
Stoll, Reliance as an Element in lOb-5 Actions, 53 ORE. L. REv. 169, 171 (1974); The Due
Diligence Requirement, supra note 12, at 758. As with due diligence, the fact that reliance
is a judicially created element probably explains the lack of clarity and uniformity in
decisions considering it. See note 45 infra; Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under
Rule lob-5, 32 U. Cm. L. Rav. 824, 824 (1965).
11 See note 15 supra. In Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), the court concluded: "At some point in time after the
publication of a curative statement . . . stockholders should no longer be able to claim
reliance on the deceptive release. . . .This is but a requirement that stockholders too act
in good faith and with due diligence in purchasing and selling stock." 446 F.2d at 103. In




in Holdsworth, sought to treat them as separate concepts." In
Holdsworth, the plaintiffs' recovery was not barred by their fail-
ure to exercise due care or due diligence, but the court reasoned:
"We are not saying that once the plaintiff has proven scienter on
the part of the defendant that he has discharged his require-
ments. Plaintiff must show that he relied on the misrepresen-
tations and that the reliance was justifiable."" In other words,
reliance involves the question of whether the plaintiff was in fact
influenced by the untrue statements or omissions of the defen-
dant. However, whether the plaintiff was in fact influenced is
wholly irrelevant to whether the plaintiff should have been influ-
enced, i.e., whether the plaintiff exercised due care under the
circumstances."
With regard to misrepresentations, the question is whether a reasonable
investor, in light of the facts existing at the time of the misrepresentation
and in the exercise of due care, would have been entitled to rely upon the
misrepresentation. With regard to nondisclosures, the issue becomes whether
a reasonable investor, in light of the facts existing at the time of the nondis-
closure and in the exercise of due care, would have been entitled to receive
full disclosure from the party charged and would have acted differently had
the alleged nondisclosure not occurred.
422 F.2d at 230. In Branham v. Material Sys. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D. Fla. 1973),
the court stated that "plaintiff has not met his burden of proof as to causation because
his reliance was unreasonable in that he failed to make a careful and diligent effort to
inquire into and discover the true facts concerning the alleged fraud." Id. at 1056. But
see McLean v. Alexander, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,725
(D. Del., Aug. 13, 1976), which concluded that due diligence "imposes on the plaintiff the
duty to act with the caution expected of a reasonable person in his position. In short, due
diligence requires plaintiff to demonstrate that whatever actual reliance he claims is well-
founded." Id. at 90,547. This definition of due diligence contrasts with the test of reliance
found in List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965), i.e., "the misrepresen-
tation is a substantial factor in determining the course of conduct which results in the
recipient's loss." Id. at 462.
11 Throughout its opinion, the court used, but failed to define, the term "justifiable
reliance." Frequently, it used the term synonomously with "materiality." E.g., 545 F.2d
at 695. However, it also observed that where the falsity of a misrepresentation should have
been "palpable," id. at 694, or that where a defendant's misrepresentations were
"obviously false," id. at 695,-in other words, where a plaintiff, in the words of the court,
has failed to exercise due diligence-no reliance could be justifiable. The court was not
entirely successful, therefore, in differentiating due diligence from reliance, or in demon-
strating that a showing of lack of due diligence has no application in those 1Ob-5 actions
alleging intentional midconduct.
" Id. at 694.
, Wheeler, supra note 12, at 592. When courts combine due diligence with the re-
quirement of reasonable reliance "the question of whether the plaintiff did, in fact,
rely-which properly is an element of causation-is confused with whether the plaintiff
should have relied-which properly is more a matter of policy." Id. at 593.
1977
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The Tenth Circuit stressed the requirement that a plaintiff
must show a causal connection between the defendant's misre-
presentation or omission and the plaintiff's injury. If the causal
link is not proven, the defendant will escape liability. In the
court's opinion, "[tihe causal relationship provided by proof of
reliance or materiality sufficiently satisfied the need for [a] cau-
sal link." 8
The recent Supreme Court decision of Affiliated Ute Citizens
v. United States49 brought into question the continued validity of
the reliance requirement in 10b-5 actions. In Affiliated Ute, there
was no positive proof that the plaintiffs had relied on the defen-
dants' misconduct when deciding to sell their stock. Instead, the
Court created a presumption of reliance once materiality had
been established, stating:
[U]nder the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a fail-
ure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to
recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material
in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them
important in the making of this decision .... This obligation to
disclose and this withholding of a material fact establish the requi-
site element of causation in fact."
However, as noted by the court in Holdsworth, the deceit in
Affiliated Ute consisted of a nondisclosure. The weight of author-
ity since Affiliated Ute has been to invoke a presumption of reli-
ance in nondisclosure cases once materiality5 has been proved,
but, in misrepresentation cases, to require a showing of reliance
in fact.2 In Holdsworth the Tenth Circuit followed this trend.
545 F.2d at 695.
" 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
Id. at 153-54.
"Misrepresented or omitted facts become material, hence actionable under 10b-5,
when, considering the complaining parties as reasonable investors, the disclosure of the
undisclosed facts or candid revelation of misleading facts would affect their trading judg-
ment." Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971), and cert. denied sub. nom. Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 405
U.S. 918 (1972).
" Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974);
Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1973); Jenkins v. Fidelity Bank, 365 F.
Supp. 1391 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Krendl & Krendl, Reviewing the Scienter Requirement in
IOb-5 Cases in the Tenth Circuit-Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), 53 DEN.
L.J. 261, 275 (1976); Stoll, supra note 43, at 181. Contra Davis v. Avco Corp., 371 F. Supp.
782 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Allen Organ Co. v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1117
(E.D. Pa. 1973); In re Caesar's Palace SEC Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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The court expressly stated that reliance is still an element in 10b-
5 actions. In nondisclosure cases, reliance is not eliminated but,
because of the difficulty of proof in such cases, once materiality
is shown, reliance is presumed. In the words of the court:
In [a] nondisclosure situation, once causal connection is proven by
showing materiality, that is to say, whether a reasonable investor
would have considered the withheld facts important . . . the reli-
ance element is inferred.
Where, as here, there are affirmative misrepresentations, the
problem of proving reliance is not the same and reliance is the ap-
propriate and decisive way to prove the chain of causation.1
3
Although the Tenth Circuit in Holdsworth sought to clarify
the issues of due diligence and reliance and determine their ap-
propriateness in the securities context following the Ernst &
Ernst decision, the two concepts have still not been adequately
differentiated. Hopefully, there will be further refinement in fu-
ture securities cases, particularly when courts are faced with de-
termining whether due diligence is an appropriate defense in a
10b-5 action based on a defendant's reckless, as opposed to inten-
tional, misconduct.
II. LAND SALES AS SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS
McCown v. Heidler54 illustrates how the federal courts have
moved away from the concept that the offer and sale of real
estate, without more, is not a securities transaction." Numerous
judicial and administrative opinions in recent years have de-
tected "securities" within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Se-
curities Act of 193311 in nonresidential condominium sales57 and
545 F.2d at 695 (citations omitted).
527 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1975). McCown also involved an interpretation of the
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1970 Supp. IV 1974),
which is not discussed in this section of the Survey but is addressed in the section on lands
and natural resources.
" See SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (1973). Cf. SEC v.
Bailey, 41 F. Supp. 647, 650 (S.D. Fla. 1941) (wherein the court noted that the Securities
Act "affects, not ordinary land sale contracts, but 'investment contracts' which evidence
primarily a right to participate in the proceeds of an income-producing venture, member-
ship in which is secured through entrusting an investor's capital to the management of
others.").
Is 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970). Section 2(1) provides:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, de-
benture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in
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in resales of instruments relating to purchases of raw land."5
McCown, melding these lines of opinions, held that offers and
sales of lots in a real estate development raised the factual
question of whether the sales, regardless of the character of the
development as either residential or nonresidential,59 constituted
securities transactions where the lots were represented and sold
as "investments. ''760
Although the court acknowledged SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.'s"
definition of an "investment contract," it clearly relied for its
holding on SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.'s62 concept of an
"investment contract." In defining "investment contracts," and
hence "securities," Howey and Joiner employ somewhat different
tests.
In Joiner, the United States Supreme Court concluded that,
in defining a security, the test is "what character the instrument
is given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan of distri-
bution, and the economic inducements held out to the pros-
any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-
trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided
interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest
or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guaran-
tee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
11 See, e.g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (1973).
" See, e.g., Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961); SEC v. Lake Havasu Estates, 340 F. Supp. 1318
(D. Minn. 1972).
11 The court noted that in 1971 the majority of purchasers indicated that they ex-
pected to reside on their lots. 527 F.2d at 210. The potential effect of the decision was to
permit a class action, brought on behalf of all lot purchasers and not just those who
purchased for "investment," to proceed under the federal securities laws. Whether class
action certification should be granted under circumstances such as those in McCown,
where the expectation of each purchaser is critical to a determination of the status of each
sale as an "investment contract," is doubtful.
" The Tenth Circuit noted:
We agree that land, as such, is not a security and that a land purchase
contract, simply because the purchaser expects or hopes that the value of the
land purchased will increase, does not fall automatically within the confines
of the Securities Acts. However, we do not agree that land or its purchase
necessarily negates the application of the Securities Acts.
Id. at 208.
"1 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
42 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
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pect." The Court noted: "In the enforcement of an act such as
this it is not inappropriate that promoters' offerings be judged as
being what they were represented to be." 4 Under Joiner, there-
fore, the manner of offer may be sufficient to characterize the
offered item as an "investment contract" where it is widely of-
fered or dealt in."5
In the later Howey decision, the Supreme Court defined an
"investment contract" as "a contract, transaction or scheme
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and
is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or
a third party."6 Under the Howey test, a promoter's representa-
tions may be irrelevant unless such representations are consid-
ered as part of an overall scheme or where the manner of the offer
might lead an investor to expect profits solely from the efforts of
another. Under Howey, therefore, it is the nature of the transac-
tion as it is conducted in fact that is of primary importance.
Joiner and Howey may also be construed as separate, but
Id. at 352-53. The Court established essentially a two-pronged test of what consti-
tutes a security:
In the Securities Act the term "security" was defined to include by name or
description many documents in which there is common trading for specula-
tion or investment. Some, such as notes, bonds, and stocks, are pretty much
standardized and the name alone carries well-settled meaning. Others are of
more variable character and were necessarily designated by more descriptive
terms, such as "transferable share," "investment contract," and "in general
any interest or instrument commonly known as a security." We cannot read
out of the statute these general descriptive designations merely because more
specific ones have been used to reach some kinds of documents. Instruments
may be included within any of these definitions, as matter of law, if on their
face they answer to the name or description. However, the reach of the Act
does not stop with the obvious and commonplace. Novel, uncommon, or
irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are also reached if it be proved
as matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under terms or
courses of dealing which established their character in commerce as
"investment contracts," or as "any interest or instrument commonly known
as a 'security.' " The proof here seems clear that these defendants' offers
brought their instruments within these terms.
Id. at 351.
" Id. at 353.
" See note 63 supra.
" 328 U.S. at 298-99. Since the McCown court did not rely on the Howey test, its
discussion of the Ninth Circuit's construction of the term "solely" in the Howey test is
dictum. 527 F.2d at 211. In other words, the Tenth Circuit has not adopted the standard
set forth in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 821 (1973).
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overlapping, tests. In fact, when the Howey Court defined an
"investment contract," it stated: "[S]uch a definition necessar-
ily underlies this Court's decision in Joiner."67 Courts often fail
to adequately differentiate the tests and instead utilize both
Howey and Joiner in reaching a decision.68
In either case, the apparent distinction between the two tests
may explain the recent tendency of courts to disregard formal
appearances and to inquire into the substance and economic real-
ity of a purported securities transaction. Recently, the Supreme
Court adopted such an approach in United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman.69 In Forman, the Court rejected a Joiner analysis
when it was confronted with the issue of whether shares of
"stock" in a nonprofit housing co-operative were securities as
defined by the securities acts. In holding that such shares of stock
were not encompassed by the acts, the Court contrasted the
Howey test, where "the investor is 'attracted solely by the pros-
pects of a return' on his investment," with those instances in
which "a purchaser is motivated by a desire to use or consume
the item purchased-'to occupy the land or to develop it them-
selves,' "0 and concluded that the securities acts do not apply to
the latter instances.7
However, in McCown, it was obviously the alleged offering
of lots as "investments," and not the alleged investment of money
in a common enterprise with respect to which investors were to
exercise no efforts, that the Tenth Circuit found decisive. The
court was so impressed with the manner in which the lots were
touted as "investments" that it quoted nineteen instances of the
use of the word in the developers' promotional materials. Yet,
there should be no question that not every "investment" is a
security, no matter how many times the word may be used in
promotional literature. As one court has stated:
" 328 U.S. at 299.
" See, e.g., Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 91-92 (5th Cir. 1975); Olpin v.
Ideal Nat'l Ins. Co., 419 F.2d 1250, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 1969); Chapman v. Rudd Paint &
Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1969).
421 U.S. 837 (1975).
Id. at 852-53. Although the Tenth Circuit, in McCown, recognized that many lots
were purchased for the purpose of acquiring a home site as opposed to merely an invest-
ment, the court dismissed this distinction by simply noting "the duality of this
'investment/ownership package.' " 527 F.2d at 211.
"1 421 U.S. at 853.
VOL. 54
SECURITIES
The mere presence of a speculative motive on the part of the pur-
chaser or seller does not evidence the existence of an "investment
contract" within the meaning of the securities acts. In a sense any-
one who buys or sells . . . hopes to realize a profitable
"investment." But the expected return is not contingent upon the
continuing efforts of another.7"
To fix on the repeated use of the word "investment" as an indi-
cium of a securities offering is to reduce the sweep of the securities
laws to a question of semantics.
The Joiner test provides no objective standard for the deter-
mination of which representations constitute the offer of an
"investment contract," and, therefore, it promotes confusion.
The strength of the Howey test, however, is that it focuses on
what should be the key element of a securities transaction-the
separation of ownership and control in an enterprise. In reliance
on the Howey test, some property interests, although not literally
"securities" within the meaning of section 2(1)-e.g., limited
partnership units-have long been regarded as securities almost
as a matter of law.73 McCown, however, could reverse this trend
by making each such determination hinge on the subjective stan-
dards of the trier of fact. If the court in McCown was willing to
accept the promised development of common area facilities as
evidence that subdivision lots may have been offered and sold as
securities, another court will no doubt find the same evidentiary
support in assumed developer obligations to obtain zoning vari-
ances, to prepare and file a plat, to mark a property with bound-
ary stakes, or to take any other action more properly the subject
of real estate law than securities law.
III. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND IMPLIED SECTION 15(c) CIVIL ACTIONS
A. Attorney's Fees
In Hail v. Heyman-Christiansen" the sole issue on appeal
was whether attorney's fees, as an added element of damages,
may be awarded to a successful plaintiff whose judgment is based
exclusively on section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.75 The Tenth Circuit
" Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359, 367
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (emphasis added).
" See 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 2.12[2] (1st ed.
1972) and cases cited therein.
536 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1976).
See notes 4 and 5 supra.
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in a per curiam opinion held that they may not be awarded,
dismissing as irrelevant the plaintiff's observation that the ap-
plicable Blue Sky Law"6 would have permitted recovery of attor-
ney's fees on a showing of facts substantially identical to those
alleged in the complaint.
The court relied on Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur" for the
proposition that attorney's fees are not recoverable in a 10b-5
action."8 Mitchell, in turn, is in line with the principles of equity
which have traditionally shaped the fashioning of remedies in
federal securities litigation.7" Thus, except where expressly au-
thorized by statute," the awarding of attorney's fees has typically
been restricted to class and deriviative actions,' usually brought
under sections 14 and 16(b) of the 1934 Act. 2 Only in such actions
have plaintiffs convincingly depicted the public interest as their
motivation in bringing suit.
3
Occasional cases have suggested broader possible bases for
the awarding of attorney's fees under the federal securities laws.
" UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-22(I)(b) (1953).
77 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
7, 446 F.2d at 106.
See generally Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); Gilbert v.
Meyer, 362 F. Supp. 168, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
" Section 11(e) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970), permits the awarding of
attorney's fees where a claim or defense is without merit. Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v.
Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269, 277 (10th Cir. 1957). Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e)
(1970), permits the assessment of attorney's fees in actions alleging certain manipulations
in connection with exchange-registered securities. Section 18(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78r(a) (1970), grants the trial court discretion to award attorney's fees to a plaintiff
successfully alleging misrepresentation in filings made pursuant to the Act or rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder.
" See, e.g., Miller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc., 515 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1975); Wechsler v.
Southeastern Properties, Inc., 506 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974); Dillon v. Berg, 482 F.2d 1237
(3d Cir. 1973); In re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation, 59 F.R.D. 657 (W.D. Okla.
1973).
,2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n, p(b) (1970). Section 14 incorporates proxy requirements. Section
16(b) permits short-swing profits by corporate insiders to be recovered for the corporation.
,3 Thus, in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 638 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), the
court stated that the purpose of awarding counsel fees in securities cases was to encourage
the vigilance of private attorneys general to provide corporate therapy for the protection
of the public investor. The court in Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 384
F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), modified, 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 425
U.S. 910 (1976) (the Second Circuit modified the district court's decision but affirmed on
the issue of attorney's fees), denied attorney's fees with the comment that the tenor of




A 1974 federal district court decision 4 denied counsel fees be-
cause the complaint neither sought a judgment financially bene-
fiting other investors nor presented "any overriding considera-
tions of justice." 5 The use of the disjunctive implied that such
considerations might well be unrelated to the public interest. A
1973 Second Circuit case8 denied an award of attorney's fees
unless "special circumstances" existed calling for the interven-
tion of a private attorney general. 7 While it is conceivable that
such "overriding considerations" or "special circumstances"
might be present in a 10b-5 action, no federal appellate court to
date in a reported decision has been pursuaded to recognize them.
B. Implied Section 15(c) Civil Actions
Hail suggested, but did not consider, several other issues.
The court noted that the plaintiff's complaint had raised two
additional claims for relief: "[Flailure to acquire reasonably cur-
rent information concerning the corporations whose stocks were
being sold (violating Rule 144 of the SEC, promulgated under
Section 15(c) of the [1934] Act); and . . . violation of Section 2
of the Rules of Fair Practice of the NASD by failing to obtain the
financial statement of plaintiff prior to recommending specula-
tive securities. '"88
Although the court's summary is confusing and somewhat
inaccurate, 9 it suggested that the plaintiff had purchased re-
stricted securities from the defendant broker-dealer in reliance
upon rule 144. One of the conditions of rule 144 is that there be
available adequate, current public information concerning the
issuer of the securities being sold.90 At least one administrative
" Smith v. Manusa, 385 F. Supp. 443 (E.D. Ky. 1974), modified, 535 F.2d 353 (6th
Cir. 1976).
' 385 F. Supp. at 454 and cases cited therein.
'n Grace v. Ludwig, 484 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974).
'7 484 F.2d at 1267 (citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391 (1970)).
536 F.2d at 909 n.1.
" Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1976), was not "promulgated under Section 15(c) of
the [1934] Act .... " Rather, it is a safe-harbor implementation of the exemption from
registration contained in section 4(1) of the 1933 Act. It permits restricted securities to
be sold under certain specified conditions without constituting the seller an "underwriter"
for purposes of section 2(11) of the 1933 Act. Rule 144 mandates no conduct and therefore
cannot be violated in the sense that rule 10b-5, for example, can.
" 17 C.F.R. 230.144(c)(2) (1976). Rule 144(c)(2) provides that, with respect to non-
reporting issuers, the public information requirement shall be deemed satisfied if essen-
tially all of the information specified in Rule 15c2-11 is publicly available.
1977
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
decision' has concluded that compliance with rule 15c2-1111 by a
broker-dealer selling restricted securities satisfies the above-
mentioned condition of rule 144. Apparently the complaint in
Hail had alleged that the broker-dealer, by violating one of the
section 15(c)(2) series of rules, had "violated" rule 144.
The more precise argument would have been that by violat-
ing rule 15c2-11 the broker-dealer had caused rule 144 to be un-
available to the seller and had thereby sold the restricted securi-
ties to the plaintiff in violation of the registration provisions of
the 1933 Act. 3 For such a violation, the remedy under section
12(1) would have been available to the plaintiff. 4 The complaint,
however, seemingly went beyond this analysis and suggested an
implied private right of action for violation of either section
15(c)(2) and the rules promulgated thereunder, or rule 144, said
implied private action being arguably independent of sections
10(b) and 12(1).11
The Tenth Circuit has not had an occasion to consider
whether section 15(c) creates a private right of action. Other
courts, however, generally in reliance on section 29 of the 1934
Act,"6 have implied such a civil action, at least with respect to
section 15(c)(1). Among the courts which have either acknowl-
edged or permitted a civil claim based on section 15 (c)(1) are the
Second and Seventh Circuits, and the United States District
Courts for the Southern District of New York, the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania, the Southern District of California, and the
0
MBS Indus., Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,865
(May 23, 1972). But see George D.B. Bonbright & Co., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,965 (July 18, 1972).
12 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11 (1976), promulgated under section 15(c)(2) of the 1934 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(2) (1970).
"s Jacobs, Persinger, & Parker, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
78,945 (June 13, 1972); preliminary note to rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1976).
"15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1970).
Violations of the section 15(c)(1) series of rules are deemed violations of section
10(b) by virture of rule 10b-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-3 (1976). The argument for an implied
private action founded on section 15(c)(1), however, does not rest on the application of
rule 10b-3.
,1 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970). Section 29(b) provides that "[e]very contract made
in violation of any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder, and every
contract . . . which involves the violation of. . .any provision of this title or any rule or
regulation thereunder, shall be void .... 1"
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Northern District of Illinois. 7 Moreover, despite the first proviso
of section 29(b) 9 -which would appear to bar the bringing of a
suit under section 29(b) for avoidance of a contract with a broker-
dealer, where the contract or its performance results in a violation
of one of the section 15(c)(2) or (c)(3) series of rules-at least one
court has recognized an implied private right of action under
section 15(c)(2).1
While the implied section 15(c)(1) civil action seems clear,
the existence of a section 15(c)(2) civil right of action is less so.
To reach the latter result, the plaintiff must argue: (1) That the
proviso of section 29(b) bars only a suit based on a violation of a
rule under section 15(c)(2) (e.g., rule 15c2-11) but not one based
on a violation of section 15(c)(2) itself; (2) that section 29(b)
applies only to claims for rescission and not for damages; or (3)
that a section 15(c)(2) remedy exists irrespective of the rights
created by section 29(b). The first of these arguments, while liter-
ally correct, would tend to frustrate the legislative intent of im-
plementing the federal securities laws through rules and regula-
tions. The second, which also is not illogical, has received a gener-
ally negative judicial reception. 00 Only the third argument has
11 Iroquois Indus. Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970); Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., 401 F.2d 47
(7th Cir. 1968); Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 365 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Powers v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., 344 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Pa., 1972); Smachlo v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 93,148 (S.D.N.Y., June 15, 1971); Shulof v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,147 (S.D.N.Y.,
May 18, 1971); Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 326 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Ill. 1970): Maher v.
J.R. Williston & Beane, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Newkirk v. Hayden, Stone
& Co., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,621 (S.D. Cal., Sept.
30, 1965); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). See also Lorenz v.
Watson, 258 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (assuming arguendo that a section 15(c)(1)
action will lie).
" "[P/rovided, (A) That no contract shall be void by reason of this subsection
because of any violation of any rule or regulation prescribed pursuant to paragraph (2) or
(3) of subsection (c) of Section 15 of this title .... " 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970).
," Franklin Nat'l Bank v. L.B. Meadows & Co., 318 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D.N.Y. 1970)
(citing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), on the implication of statutory reme-
dies).
11 Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 365 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Maher v.
J.R. Williston & Beane, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc., 40 F




genuine appeal. There is no apparent reason why the statutory
prohibitions contained in sections 15(c)(2) and (c)(3), and the
rules promulgated thereunder, should be given effect only by an
enforcement action. Perhaps the intent of the drafters of the first
proviso of section 29(b) was simply to ensure the regularity of
trading markets by barring the innocent purchaser (or seller) of
a security from avoiding certain contracts with a broker-dealer
where the effect would be to restore an innocent seller (or pur-
chaser) to the status quo. Where such a consequence can be
avoided, the statutory tort theory should support an implied right
of action against the broker-dealer under sections 15(c)(2) and
(c) (3).,o1
Although the trial court in Hail did not find it necessary to
rule on the plaintiff's rule 144 claim, it might well have dismissed
it. Rule 144 may establish a norm of conduct against which the
actions of a broker-dealer might be measured. °0 It was promul-
gated, however, not primarily as a part of the SEC's regulation
of broker-dealers but rather as part of the SEC's continuing effort
to prevent leakage of unregistered securities into trading mar-
kets.'0 3 Thus the rule imposes no affirmative duty on broker-
dealers' 4 and, even if it protects the public in an abstract sense,
it creates no liability which cannot be enforced through existing
statutory means.0 5 Similarly, plaintiff's claim of violation of sec-
tion 2 of the N.A.S.D. Rules of Fair Practice was properly dis-
missed by the trial court,'0 perhaps because the broker-dealer's
,0, See Franklin Nat'l Bank v. L.B. Meadows & Co., 318 F. Supp. 1339, 1342-43
(E.D.N.Y. 1970). See also Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
102 Cf. Lavin v. A.G. Becker & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,446 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 10, 1973); Cash v. Frederick & Co., 57 F.R.D. 71 (E.D.
Wis. 1972) (alleged violation of N.A.S.D. Rules of Fair Practice relevant to suggest what
duty the defendant had to the plaintiff under rule 10b-5); SEC Release No. 34-9420, 3 FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 25,592 (Feb. 11, 1972) (N.A.S.D. Rules of Fair Practice are written
norms of conduct).
" See H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 73, § 4.01.
Contra Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
... Id. Cf. SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 988 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 880 (1972).
'I" See Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 181 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 817 (1966). The trial court dismissed the claim on the strength of Utah v. DuPont
Walston, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,812 (D. Utah,
Oct. 1, 1974), which in turn had relied on Colonial Realty Corp.
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failure to obtain a financial statement of its customer before rec-
ommending a speculative security for purchase may already
have been a violation of section 15(c)(2) and rule 15c2-5(a)(2)' s
promulgated thereunder.
IV. DEFENSE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Green v. Utah, '08 in one of the few reported decisions on
point, tested the question of whether the eleventh amendment to
the United States Constitution"' bars the bringing of a suit in
federal court"" against a state under the federal securities laws.
Under the eleventh amendment, states, absent a judicially per-
ceived waiver-either express or implied-have been held im-
mune from suits of their own ditizens or those of other states, to
enforce federal statutory liabilities."' Only the Second, Fourth,
and Sixth Circuits, however, have previously considered the ques-
tion in a federal securities context. On facts remarkably similar
to those of Green, the Sixth Circuit twice,"' and the Fourth Cir-
cuit once,"' have held that the eleventh amendment protects the
Commonwealths of Kentucky and Virginia respectively from suit.
The Second Circuit in Forman v. Community Services, Inc."'
found that the State of New York had waived its sovereign im-
munity by subsidizing a nonprofit cooperative apartment com-
pany which allegedly issued securities."5
07 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c-5(a)(2) (1976). Rule 15c2-5(a)(2) imposes upon a broker-dealer
arranging credit in certain transactions the obligation to ascertain and document, includ-
ing the retention of a customer financial statement, that the transaction is suitable to the
customer's financial situation and needs.
539 F.2d 1266 (10th Cir. 1976).
' The eleventh amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
"I Federal district court jurisdiction is exclusive under the 1934 Act and concurrent
with the state courts under the 1933 Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(a), 78aa (1970). There is
some equitable appeal to the argument of the plaintiff in Green that if the federal district
court were to dismiss her action under the 1934 Act for which federal jurisdiction is
exclusive, it would unfairly deny her a right of action altogether.
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
"' Yeomans v. Kentucky, 514 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 983
(1976); Brown v. Kentucky, 513 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1976).
" Dawkins v. Craig, 483 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1973). See also MacKethan v. Virginia,
370 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Va. 1974).
1" 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. United Hous.
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
"1 500 F.2d at 1255-56.
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In Green a Utah industrial loan company depositor brought
suit under section 10(b) against the State of Utah and the Utah
Commissioner of Financial Institutions, among others, for gross
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in allegedly failing to
supervise and control adequately the loan company which was in
receivership at the time the action was commenced. Assuming
arguendo that the depositor's thrift-certificate passbooks, deben-
ture bonds, and thrift certificates were "securities" within the
meaning of section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act,"6 the Tenth Circuit
distinguished between regulatory and proprietary functions of a
state and held that, in the absence of a clear congressional intent
to subject states to suit, sovereign immunity protects the states
when they are engaged in regulatory functions pursuant to estab-
lished governmental powers."' The court did not find it necessary
to decide the corollary issue of whether the federal securities laws
manifest an intent to subject states to suit when engaged in pro-
prietary functions, nor did it seek to define what such proprietary
functions might include."8 The implication of the court's reason-
ing, however, was that proprietary functions include the raising
of capital through the issuance of securities, and that, when en-
gaged in such activities, states, state agencies, and political sub-
"' 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970). By somewhat sketchy analyses, the federal courts
have consistently held that evidences of indebtedness issued by industrial banks or in-
dustrial loan companies do not constitute securities exempt from 1933 Act registration by
having been "issued or guaranteed by any bank .... " 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1970). Cf.
Commercial Credit Co. (SEC No-Action Letter), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 78,544 (Nov. 5, 1971) (nonnegotiable passbook accounts of industrial loan
company not exempt from registration under either section 3(a)(2) or section 3(a)(5) of
the 1933 Act).
"I This distinction, first articulated in Bailey v. City of New York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y.
1842), and labelled the "proprietary-governmental" distinction, was employed by the
Eighth Circuit in Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 452 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc), aff'd, 411 U.S. 279 (1973). In
the context of securities law the Sixth Circuit adopted the reasoning in Employees, re-
christening the distinction the "proprietary-regulatory" dichotomy. Brown v. Kentucky,
513 F.2d 333, 336 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 983 (1976); Yeomans v. Kentucky,
514 F.2d 993, 994 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 983 (1976). As a solution to the
problem, at least one author has suggested that the characterization of the state function
be made but one element in a multipronged test to determine whether immunity attaches
in a particular case. Note, Implied Waiver of a State's Eleventh Amendment Immunity,
1974 DUKE L.J. 925.
"' The court suggested, nevertheless, that intentional wrongdoing, like aiding and
abetting or any other active participation by a state, is insufficient to alter the general
rule. 539 F.2d at 1274.
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divisions enjoy no eleventh amendment protection."'
The waiver concept is a particularly arcane concept of consti-
tutional law.' 0 It is consistent, however, with the essential nature
of federalism as permitting the state and federal governments to
exercise power independently of each other. Nevertheless, one
wonders whether the Tenth Circuit, or any other federal appellate
court, would allow a state to be immune from civil suit in federal
court under the circumstances in which the state's regulatory
power was used, for example, for criminal purposes. The Tenth
"I Id. at 1272-73. State agencies and political subdivisions have generally been held
to enjoy no immunity under the eleventh amendment, regardless of the nature of the
functions they exercise, although some courts have indicated that this may involve ques-
tions of fact. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Clemson Agric. College, 221 U.S. 636 (1911); Wright v.
Houston Indep. School Dist., 393 F. Supp. 1149, 1152-54 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Southern
Bridge Co. v. Department of Highways, 319 F. Supp. 948, 951 (E.D. La. 1970).
'I" The basic fiction is that, by ratifying the Constitution which has always included
the commerce clause, the thirteen original states in 1787 gave to Congress the power to
enact laws regulating commerce and thereby effectively waived immunity from suit
brought on violations of such laws, at least insofar as the intent of Congress to subject
the states to suit was clear. Such argument ignores the fact that the eleventh amendment
was not ratified by the required number of states until 1797. It is generally accepted that
all sections of the Constitution must be construed together with no one constitutional
guarantee enjoying a preference over any other. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422
(1956); Linn Land Co. v. Udall, 255 F. Supp. 382 (D. Ore. 1966), rev'd on other grounds
sub nor. Udall v. Battle Mountain Co., 385 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
957 (1968). In construing the eleventh amendment and the commerce clause together, one
reasonable harmonization is that the framers of the Constitution gave to Congress the
power to enact laws regulating commerce, which power was modified by the right of the
states, under specified circumstances, to be immune from suit in federal court. Such
construction is supported by the analogous principle of state constitutional law that the
last in time of two conflicting constitutional provisions, or of a constitutional provision
and an amendment, is preferred. See, e.g., In re Interrogatories by General Assembly, 171
Colo. 200, 467 P.2d 56 (1970); Sharpe v. State, 448 P.2d 301 (Okla. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 904 (1969); City & County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1958).
Under this doctrine of last change, the eleventh amendment would control. Instead, by
articulating the theory of waiver or implied consent, the courts have used illogic and a
patent legal fiction to reach a result more appropriately grounded on concepts of federal-
ism. Green illustrates this latter point. Instead of focusing on whether Utah, as a matter
of state law, had waived its sovereign immunity to suit in federal court, the court con-
cerned itself almost exclusively with whether Congress, as a matter of federal law, had
intended to subject the states to suit under the federal securities laws. See Ford Motor
Co. v. Department of Tress., 323 U.S. 459 (1945) (question of waiver is a matter of state
law); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 311 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 377
U.S. 184 (1964). But see Red Star Towing & Transp. Co. v. Department of Transp., 423
F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1970) (Congress must express an intent to override a state's immunity
in order to subject the state to suit by private individuals). By such reasoning, the implica-
tions of the statutory definition of "person" contained in the 1934 Act, for example,
become a major, and mistaken, issue.
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Circuit's distinction between regulatory and proprietary func-
tions assumes that governmental authority is, and can be, effec-
tively used at the state level to accomplish objectives consistent
with those of the federal securities laws. However, the enactment
of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975,21 which included a
sweeping overhaul of federal law with respect to municipal securi-
ties, would seem to indicate some congressional dissatisfaction
with that assumption.
V. DETERMINATION OF A "SECURITY" AS A FACTUAL QUESTION
In United States v. Gibbs, In the Tenth Circuit concluded in
dictum that what constitutes a "security" is essentially a ques-
tion of fact to be submitted to the trier of fact, even in a civil case.
This result was contrary to its earlier holding in Ahrens v.
American-Canadian Beaver Co. 123 and to the literal approach of
Joiner. 12, It was consistent, however, with the implicit rejection
of the Joiner approach which culminated in United Housing Inc.
v. Forman. 125 Like McCown v. Heidler, 26 this development cre-
ates a problem because it fails to suggest which transactions out
of the general multitude of transactions should be regarded as
"securities" as a matter of fact thereby making available to plain-
tiffs the special fraud procedures, protections, and remedies af-
forded by the federal securities laws.'"
I Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
' No. 75-1568 (10th Cir., Apr. 2, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
428 F.2d 926, 928 (10th Cir. 1970).
2 SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943). See note 63 supra.
Out of different considerations, perhaps, the right to submit to the jury the question of
whether an instrument or transaction is a "security" has generally been upheld in criminal
cases. United States v. Austin, 462 F.2d 724 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972);
Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435, 440 (5th Cir. 1961).
'- 421 U.S. 837 (1975). So many courts have adopted the "economic realities" test
set forth in Joiner, or a "substance versus form" test, with respect to devices not literally
within the definition of "security," that it comes as a surprise to find an occasional court
holding that a particular note, for example, is a "security" per se solely because a note is
defined as a security in section 2(1) of the 1933 Act or section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act.
Compare, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1078 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1009 (1972) (a "note" is a security) with Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332,
336 (1967) (in construing the meaning of "security," form should be disregarded for sub-
stance and the emphasis should be on economic reality) and United Hous. Foundation,
421 U.S. 837 (1975).
527 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1975).
'v See Davis v. Avco Corp., 371 F. Supp. 782, 787 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (quoting Coffey,
The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 CAsE
W. REs. L. REv. 367, 373 (1967)).
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VI. DERIVATIVE ACTIONS FOR THE RECOVERY OF SHORT-SWING
PROFITS
The court, in Morales v. Mapco, Inc.,2 8 held that section
16(b) of the 1934 Act"9 permitted a corporation to recover short-
swing profits where an insider acquired warrants to purchase
stock, voluntarily exercised the warrants (or otherwise acquired
the underlying stock) by paying cash of $9.00 per warrant more
than six months later, and sold the underlying stock within six
months after exercise. The court held that, until the warrants
were exercised by the payment of cash, the warrant holder had
no equity ownership in the corporation but, instead, had only a
right to purchase stock. The first date of exercise therefore trig-
gered the application of section 16(b). The court distinguished
cases concerned with the conversion of shares of one class of cor-
porate securities into those of another, and involuntary transac-
tions such as those resulting from mergers. The court also held
that the exercise of each warrant constituted a "purchase" within
the meaning of section 16(b) and that a showing of intent to
realize short-swing profits is not required under the terms of the
statute.
" 541 F.2d 233 (loth Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
1977

